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1.  INTRODUCTION
Sweden is known as a relatively wealthy country with an inequality of income and wealth
that is low in an international comparison. The public sector is large and it includes rather
generous transfers to private households many of which are not means tested. Largest among
them are the public pensions. Most Swedes who retire thus receive a major share of their
pensions from the public. Until recently the incentives to accumulate private wealth for
retirement have thus been less in Sweden than in countries with different pension systems. A
relatively high taxation of the return to capital, on the stock of wealth and of gifts and
bequests have reduced these incentives even further.
It is possible to identify major changes in policy and markets at the end of the last
century that have had an impact on the wealth distribution. In the end of the 1980s the
financial markets were deregulated which resulted in a credit expansion and increased the
demand for credit financed real estate and consumer durables. In the beginning of the 1990s
a major tax reform was passed in the Swedish Parliament that lowered marginal tax rates for
labor incomes, introduced a flat tax rate of 30 percent on capital incomes and broadened the
tax base. Capital incomes were previously taxed at the high marginal rates of labor incomes,
but the reform made taxation of labor and capital incomes more conformable.
Like many other countries Sweden also experienced volatile asset prices in the
1990s. In particular the prices of stocks and shares showed an exceptional increase until
1999 when the market turned down (see Figure 1). Compared to the price of these assets
house prices were relatively stable during the whole period. But a closer look reveals that
they decreased by almost 25 percent from 1990 to 1993 and did not reach the 1990 level
again until the end of 1999 or beginning of year 2000. There were also regional differences
in the movements of house prices. All these changes did not only inflate the average wealth
of Swedish households but also increased wealth inequality.
It is also possible to trace effects from demographic changes on the distribution of
wealth. In the 1990s the large baby-boom cohorts of the 1940s reached the age when people
typically reach the peak of their wealth. They also started to retire at the end of the 1990s.
The plan of this paper is first to give some background information about of the level
and inequality of household wealth in Sweden. Unfortunately there is no data source that
measures the distribution of wealth consistently, but we have to jump between different data
sources and try to piece them together. Then follows a discussion of the changes mentioned2
above and their effects on the distribution of wealth. The paper ends with a few concluding
comments.
2. GENERAL FEATURES OF THE SWEDISH DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
2.1  Data Difficulties Dim A Longer Perspective
Using the estimates of Statistics Sweden median household wealth was just above 80 000
crowns in the end of the 1970s (in 1997 prices).
1 This level reached a peak in 1990 at
115 000 and then stayed just above 100 000 crowns in this decade (see Table 1). This is an
increase by about 30 percent in about 20 years. Even if the year 1999 with exceptionally
high values of stocks and shares is excluded the increase in the top decile of the distribution
was much higher, about 50%, while there was no increase in the left tail of the distribution.
The inequality of wealth thus increased.
The estimates in Spånt (1987) suggested that the inequality of declared net wealth
declined from the beginning of the previous century to the middle of the 1970s. According to
Jansson & Johansson (1988) the decline then came to a halt in the 1970s. Statistics Sweden
(2000) estimated the Gini coefficient of household net worth to 0.78 in 1978. It then
increased to 0.84 in the beginning of the 1990s and remained at about 0.86 until 1997.
2  Due
to the large increase in the value of stocks and shares in the last few years of this decade
inequality probably increased even more in these years.
These estimates were based on register data collected from self-assessments for
taxation and in later years also on reports directly to the tax authorities from banks, brokers
and insurance companies. The quality of these data has thus increased but they suffer from
the constraints imposed by the taxation system, this is in particular true for the estimates
before the second half of the 1990s. Certain assets like most consumer durables are not
included because they were not taxed, others such as bonds, condominiums and unlisted
stocks and shares are underreported or their market value underestimated.
3 This will
influence very much both the estimates of levels and inequality. Compare the estimates from
Statistics Sweden in the right panel of Table 1 with those of the left panel from the Swedish
household panel surveys (HUS)! The latter estimates, mostly based on survey responses,
show a much higher median level, a little more than 500 000 crowns in the 1980s that
                                                   
1 In the 1980s and 1990s the exchange rate between the USD and the SEK varied from 5 crowns per dollar to
8.50. In Klevmarken et al (2003) we used the PPP 9.85
2 Statistics Sweden (2000) Table 16
3 The notional and real wealth in the form of public and negotiated group pensions are not included. This form
of wealth is not included in data from the HUS surveys either.3
increased to 676 000 in 1997. This is also an increase by about 30 percent but for a five year
shorter period.
Table 1 also shows that the inequality of these survey data is smaller than that of
register data. The right tail of the distribution has increased relative to the median, but so has
the left tail. There is an increase in inequality according to these estimates too, but not as
strong as in the estimates of Statistics Sweden. At first one might think that this is not totally
unexpected. With survey data it is usually difficult to capture the extreme right tail of the
wealth distribution while register data do cover the very wealthy. But this is not the main
explanation for the difference in inequality. It is found in the fact that data from Statistics
Sweden use a household concept that originates from the taxation process and not a concept
suitable for economic analysis.
A household in HUS is a group of people that share the same dwelling and share
meals, while the household concept used by Statistics Sweden depends on who might be
considered for joint taxation. People who live together without being legally married and do
not have common children are considered single, and adult children (parents) that live with
their parents (children) are also considered single. As a result Statistics Sweden gets too
many one-person households compared to an economically meaningful definition, and most
of them have very little wealth.
Table 2 compares HUS-data with data from Statistics Sweden by type of asset. The
fact that Statistics Sweden does not have any data on durables except for cars implies a
major underestimate of this type of asset. However, the HUS mean estimates of all assets
and also of liabilities exceed those of Statistics Sweden. These differences in measures do
not only result because HUS data cover more assets and value them at market prices, but
primarily from the differences in household definitions.
Another important difference between the two data sources is the difference in age
range covered. While Statistics Sweden covers the whole age range from the age of 16
without any upper limit, HUS starts at the age of 18 and has too few households above the
age of 75 compared to the Swedish population.
4 This will inflate the HUS mean and median
estimates, and probably reduce measures of inequality.
                                                   
4 The sample of the first HUS wave in 1984 was limited to the age range 18-75. In later waves people have
been followed even beyond this age, but refreshment samples have been restricted to the ages 18-75.4
2.2  Who Is Wealthy And Who Is Poor?
Even if the wealth distribution in Sweden is less unequal than in most other countries and
even if we disregard the extreme right tail of the distribution, there are large differences in
wealth also among ordinary people. Table 3 reproduces results from Andersson et al (2002)
based on relatively new data from Statistic Sweden.
5 The table shows the results of a
regression of net worth per adult equivalent in 1997 and 1999 on a number of socio-
economic variables including age, marital status, schooling, work, geographical region and
type of housing.
The relation between wealth and age is not exactly the same we are used to see.
Equivalized wealth first decreases to a minimum in the age bracket 30-34.
6 Then it increases
without any decrease at the end of the life-cycle. The initial decrease could be a result of
households incurring debts when families are formed, children arrive and they buy houses or
condominiums. In the beginning of the working career immediately after school there is
uncertainty about future jobs and incomes and people hesitate to take up loans, but after a
few years most people have found a good job and count on future increases in incomes. They
then become more willing to borrow. At this age income uncertainty is also reduced by
marriage or union formation. The probability that both spouses will loose their incomes is
smaller than that one will do it. The larger flow of incomes and the reduced uncertainty
about the future thus make people more willing to borrow.
The normally observed decrease in wealth among older people is in this analysis
picked up by other variables than the age variable. The share of single women is high among
old people and single women have more than 100 000 crowns less in wealth than single men
and about 70 000 less than married. We also find rather many elderly in rented apartments
and they are on average less wealthy than those who live in a condominium or in an owned
house. Finally, due to an error in the coding of education everyone above 74 got the code
unspecified education and this group has less wealth than other educational groups.
Population heterogeneity in other dimensions than age thus explains the hump shaped age-
wealth relation.
Though not included in the analysis above one could add that bequests are likely to
contribute the cross-sectional hump shape too. About 30 percent of Swedish households
have received bequests. Although most bequests are small and the average bequest is smaller
                                                   
5 These data originate from banks, brokers, insurance companies and not from self assessment forms. Tax-
assessed values of owner occupied houses, secondary houses and condominiums have been replaced by
estimates of market values. Also the market values of cars held by the household have been estimated. Private
pension insurances and annuities are not included.
6 The age group 20-24 is the base of comparison.5
in Sweden than in the United States (compare the results of Klevmarken, 2002b, and Wolff,
2002), they do contribute to the peak of the cross-sectional age-wealth profile because most
bequests are given to middle aged people. Although not conclusive, these results suggest that
population heterogeneity and bequests rather than the life-cycle hypothesis explain the shape
of the raw age-wealth relationship.
We also find that those who had disability pension and those who were immigrants
had relatively less wealth. Self-employed and in particular farmers had much more wealth
than employees. Farmers had on average about 1 million crowns more than employees and
other self-employed on average 140 000 more.
Schooling is a good predictor of wealth. Those who lived in households with a head
with college or university on average had 270 000 – 280 000 more than if the head only had
compulsory schooling.
7
The area in which the household lives and whether they have invested in a house or
not also become very important for their accumulated wealth. The trends in real estate prices
have depended on area, and price differences between them are large. Our results show that
those who live in own houses or in condominiums are wealthier than those who live in
rented apartments. The difference depends though on where the household lives. Those who
own a house in Stockholm have on average almost 550 000 crowns more than those who
have a house in a middle sized or small city, and on average about 650 000 more than a
comparable household that lives in a rented apartment in Stockholm. Those who own their
house in Gothenburg or Malmö have on average 250 000 – 300 000 less in equivalized net
wealth than those who own a house in Stockholm. People who have a condominium in
Stockholm have almost 400 000 more in equivalized wealth than comparable people having
a condominium somewhere else in Sweden. The housing market in Stockholm has been a
tighter market for a longer period than markets elsewhere in Sweden.
Finally we find that those who had claimed deductions in their self assessment for
income taxation for payments to a private pension policy on average owned about 100 000
more than those who had no claims. Because the accumulated value of these pension policies
were not included in the wealth concept used in this analysis one might have expected to
find a negative effect, but the current result is probably explained by wealthy people
claiming a deduction more frequently than less wealthy.
                                                   
7 These estimates average out any cohort differences in schooling. The share of a birth cohort that goes to
higher education has increased in the period after World War II and the return to an additional year of
schooling has decreased (Edin & Holmlund, 1995 and LeGrand et al 2001).6
The analysis above was limited to household private wealth. Wealth in the form of
notional or real accounts in the public pension system and the negotiated group pensions
were not included. It takes a large share of the total wealth of Swedish households as will be
discussed below in section 3.2.
3. THREE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE 1990s
3.1  The 1991 Tax Reform Changed The Portfolio Composition
At the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s major changes in the Swedish
income tax system influenced household portfolios. Cuts in the marginal tax rates and
limitations in the possibilities to deduct interest paid had been introduced in the second half
of the 1980s and then followed the major tax reform in 1990/91. To recapitulate, this reform
decreased the marginal income taxes, broadened the tax basis and included major changes in
the taxation of the returns from financial assets and real estate. The expected effects on the
distribution of wealth were a decrease in the share of liabilities, real estate and consumer
durables and an increase in the share of financial assets, in particular, bank deposits and
bonds. Table 2 confirms that most of these changes took place. Using HUS-data the table
shows that the ratio of debts relative to gross wealth decreased from 28 percent to 22
percent. The share of financial assets increased from 17 percent to 28 percent while that of
durables decreased from 31 percent to 21 percent. The share of real estate remained
approximately the same.
3.2  Doubts About A Viable Public Pension System Give Incentives To Increase Private
Savings In Pension Policies.
In the post war period all Swedes above the age of 65 have been covered by a basic social
security pension
8 and in 1960 an income related supplementary pension was introduced in
the form of a pay-as-you-go system that covered all employees and many self-employed.
Above a low income threshold and below a ceiling the income related pensions were 60
percent of the average incomes for the 15 best years. These pensions were indexed by the
CPI. In the 1990s the viability of this system became a concern facing the aging of the large
baby boom cohorts and the relatively low growth of the Swedish economy. Economic and
political discussions of the future of the pension system and proposals for reforms resulted in
1994 in a decision in Parliament about a new pension system. It is less vulnerable to
                                                   
8 Before 1976 the eligibility age was 67.7
demographic and economic shocks, but it might also result in lower pensions than the
previous system. (See Klevmarken, 2002a)
In addition to the public social security pensions most workers in Sweden are
covered by negotiated group pensions (occupational pensions). Similar to the public
pensions some of them were of the defined benefit type, but after the reform of the public
system most of them have been changed in the direction of a defined contribution system.
For most workers these pensions have a replacement rate of about 10 percent after the age of
65, for workers with high wages_mostly white collar workers_the replacement ratio is
higher.
9
Although an unfunded pension system like the (old) Swedish system does not have
any funds expect for buffer funds, it implies a liability to those who have participated in the
system. Workers have a claim on a future stream of pension payments that can be evaluated
in the form of an implicit pension capital that can be attributed to everyone who is covered.
For most Swedes this is a large amount compared to private wealth. The magnitude of the
capital value of public pensions and negotiated group pensions was estimated in Andersson
et al (2002) using 1999 data from Statistics Sweden and assumptions about the future that
are detailed in an appendix of this publication. Table 4 is obtained from two of the tables in
Andersson et al (2002). It compares for two age groups and four major occupational groups
private wealth to the capital value of public old age and negotiated group pensions. The table
shows median assets, so it is not possible to add public and private assets and compare, but it
is still quite clear that the claims on the public pension system and on the negotiated group
systems by far exceed private wealth. For blue collar workers the value of the public old age
pensions exceeds 60 percent of the median gross wealth (including pension wealth) and for
white-collar workers it amounts to about half median gross wealth.
Reduced pensions would thus have a major impact on total wealth of an average
Swedish household and the increased uncertainty about future pensions have increased
private investments in pension policies. Table 5 illustrates this. In the middle of the 1980s
less than 15 percent of all households had private pension policies and the mean holding was
rather small, about 90 000 crowns among those who had the asset. At the end of the 1990s
more than 30 percent had this kind of asset and the average value had increased to an
estimated 150 000 crowns per household. It is not possible to get more than an informed
guess of the latter amount because the first three rows of the table are based on survey data
                                                   
9 Depending on group plan the occupational group pensions also allow for early retirement with more generous
replacement rates.8
from HUS using the consumption based household concept while the last two rows of the
table are estimates for individuals obtained from Flood (2003) that used register data from a
longitudinal data base called LINDA.
10
3.3  The Large Baby-Boom Cohorts Retire Wealthy
The life-cycle hypothesis is a main vehicle in analysing the wealth distribution and its
implications have been studied empirically in the previous literature. Most cross-sectional
studies show a hump shaped relation between wealth and age while studies based on panel
data do not always confirm that households consume their wealth after retirement. Figure 2
displays cross-sectional profiles for equivalized household net worth for 1999. The age-
wealth profile for the 90
th percentile of the distribution shows a strong hump shape while it is
much less pronounced for the median and has completely disappeared in the 10
th percentile.
Those who permanently are in the left part of the distribution have very little they could
liquidize for consumption when they retire. The wealth of the large group in the middle of
the wealth distribution primarily consists of owner occupied houses and condominiums and
many choose not to liquidize this asset when they grow old. They prefer to stay in their old
home and they also seem reluctant to increase their mortgages. As a result we only see a
weak hump shape. Only in the right upper part of the wealth distribution we find households
with financial wealth that is easier to use for consumption purposes. Is this the explanation to
the hump shape of the 90
th percentile? The wealth of many of these households generate a
return that jointly with pensions are likely to maintain the consumption standard of these
people when they grow old. Thus they might not need to reduce their wealth. So, can we find
an alternative explanation to the hump shape?
In section 2.2 it was pointed out that age is associated with population heterogeneity
that is able to pick up the hump in the age-wealth profile. We will now focus on one
particular aspect of heterogeneity, namely that different birth cohorts have different
experiences which influence their accumulated wealth. Figure 3 shows median age-net worth
profiles for two years 1983 and 1997. The shape of the profiles has changed. The peak is
higher in 1997 than in 1983 and in these 14 years it is pushed from the age range around 50
years beyond the age of 60. The lack of stability in the age-wealth profiles suggests that
                                                   
10 Below a ceiling investments in a private pension policy can be deducted against income in assessing taxable
income. The tax authorities thus know when a tax payer claimed a deduction and the amount claimed truncated
by the ceiling. These data that are available longitudinally in LINDA have been used in Flood(2003) to
estimate the current accumulated value of the investments of each individual in LINDA. It is encouraging to
see that these two different approaches to estimate investments in private pension policies give approximately
comparable results.9
there are other forces than stable life-cycle savings that determine the wealth distribution. In
Klevmarken (2002b) and Andersson et al (2002) it was argued that most of the cross-
sectional hump shape originated from cohort differences in wealth accumulation. In an
attempt to separate birth cohort effects on wealth from the age effect it was shown that the
cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s did better than older cohorts. They also did better than
younger cohorts in the left tail of the distribution while among those who were relatively
wealthy the cohorts of the 1960s and 1970s had succeeded better than any previous cohorts
relative to their age. The latter observations might be a “dot.com” effect that would have
vanished if we had had access to more recent data covering the period after the recent stock
market decrease.  The relative success of the large baby boom cohorts is though likely to
have survived the stock market swings (Berg, 2002). The cohorts of the 1940s could take
advantage of the relatively prosperous 1960s and 1970s, periods of relatively high growth
not disturbed by periods of high unemployment. These cohorts were able to get a job and to
keep it, buy a house or a condominium and then surface on the price increases in the real
estate and stock markets. Some of them also benefited from subsidies to those who invested
in their own houses. Older generations had to carry on the heritage of the depression in the
1930s and the war-time economy in the 1940s.
The age-wealth profiles estimated net of these cohort effects showed almost no hump
shape. Only the profile for the 90
th percentile had a week tendency to level off after the age
of 70 (see Klevmarken 2002b, Figure 8). The estimates in this age range were however
rather uncertain because the number of observations of the oldest-old is small in the HUS
surveys.
The implication of these findings is that there is relatively little private life-cycle
savings in Sweden. Most of this kind of saving is done through the social security system
and through the negotiated group pensions. Although Swedish households do accumulate
wealth, active saving out of regular incomes is not the main explanation to changes in
household private wealth, as pointed out by Pålsson (2002). More important are price
changes in the asset markets and the ability of households to manage their portfolios.
4. CONCLUSIONS
At the end of the 1990s median household net wealth was about 700 000 crowns while the
mean was above 1 million. Compared to the United States the Swedish median wealth is
somewhat higher while the mean is only about half of that of the United States (c f10
Klevmarken et al, 2003). Although the Swedish distribution of wealth is unequal, for
instance compared to the income distribution, it is much less unequal than that of the United
States.
In the 1990s household median wealth in Sweden increased by about 30 percent in
real terms. Part of this increase came from increased savings after the tax reform in the
beginning of the 1990s. The Swedish savings rate peaked at about 12-13 percent in 1993/94,
but dropped back down below 5 percent in 1998/99. We have observed that savings in
private pension policies have increased, but it is hard to know to what extent this is new
savings and to what extent it is a reallocation of portfolios. Part of the increase in wealth can
also be attributed to the exceptional increase in the stock market, but its influence on median
wealth is not as large as one might think because stocks and shares take a large share of the
portfolio only among the wealthy. The increase in the value of stocks and shares is though
the major explanation to the increase in inequality of wealth during this period. More
important for ordinary people than stock prices is the value of one and two family houses. It
only increased by a modest 3 percent in real terms in the 1990s. However, the difference
between peak and trough was larger and there were large regional differences. Price
increases were higher in the three big cities and in particular in Stockholm that contributed to
an increased regional inequality in wealth and probably also to the over all increase in
inequality (c f Berg 2001).
An important finding that has implications for the future is that the baby-boom
cohorts have become relatively wealthy, both in terms of private wealth and in claims on the
pension system. They will now retire, but still keep an influence in society, not only because
of their size but also because of their wealth. Their wealth is though more vulnerable to
volatile prices in the financial markets than before because the share of financial assets has
increased and because the pension reforms have made future pensions more depended on the
financial markets. There is also a political risk that the large baby-boom cohorts to an
increasing extent will have to pay for the health services and care they will need in the
future, services that now are financed through the general tax fund. If these forces will not
erode the wealth of the baby-boomers their children will inherit. Bequests will then become
more common than it is today and the amounts inherited will most likely increase. Most
people think this will in the future increase the inequality of the wealth distribution even
further, but as demonstrated in Klevmarken (2002b) that is not necessarily the case.
Finally, it has been argued in this paper that private life-cycle savings is not so strong
in Sweden, but that most of this kind of savings have been done through the public and11
collective pension systems. The “savings boom” in the beginning of the 1990s should be
seen as an exception, an adjustment to the change in the tax system. However, the concern
for the future viability of the pension systems, the change of these systems in the direction of
funded systems and the boom in the stock market have made Swedish households more
aware of financial instruments like mutual funds, stocks and shares. Ownership of these
assets have spread down the wealth distribution and this change jointly with the increased
savings in pension policies might well signify a change in the savings behavior of Swedish
households towards more life-cycle savings.12
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Table 1  Percentiles of networth 1978-1999 according to two different
Surveys (1999 price level)
HUS-survey     Statistics Sweden HINK/HEK
_________________________________________________________________________
     Median in
      decile
Year  P10 P50 P90 P10/P50 P90/P50    1   5   10   P50  MD1/P50 MD10/P50
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1978   - 33  50 1271   83    -0.40  15.31
1983   6  518 1407  0.012  2.716   - 70  57 1155   90    -0.78  12.83
      (9) (33)(104)
1985  36  516 1362  0.069  2.639   - 88  64 1217  104    -0.85  11.70
      (6) (13) (59)
1988   -138  75 1600   115    -1.20  13.91
1990   -154  70 1758   116    -1.33  15.16
1992  30  553 1692  0.055  3.058   -167  64 1494   101    -1.65  14.79
     (11) (27) (74)
1995  55  624 1803  0.088  2.887 
     (10) (15) (71)
1997  54  676 1972  0.080  2.916   -167  69 1900   109    -1.53  17.43
     (11) (18) (59)
1999    -427 59 3815   106    -4.03  35.99
Note: The sample size of the HUS-surveys range from 2619 to 4187 individuals, and
the sample size of the HIN/HEK surveys from approximately 10000 to 19000
individuals. The two data sources differ in coverage and household definition, see
text!
Sources: HUS: Klevmarken(2002b) Table 1. HINK/HEK: Pålsson(2002) Table 2
and Statistics Sweden(2000).
Table 2.  Estimates of 1985 and 1997 portfolio shares and mean
wealth per household by type of asset and data source
(1997 1000SEK)
          HUS     HINK/HEK
1000SEK      % 1000SEK      %
                          1985
Real estate  492  52.2  59
Financial assets  156  16.6  33
Other assets
(durables)
 294  31.2   8
Gross total  942 100.0  100
Debts  268  28.4   39
Net total  674  71.6   61
                      1997
Real estate  642  51.0  374  57.9
Financial assets  354  28.1  224  34.7
Other assets
(durables)
 264  20.9   48   7.4
Gross total 1259 100.0  646 100.0
Debts  276  21.9  179  27.8
Net total  983  78.1  467  72.2
Sources: Klevmarken et.al (2003), Statistics Sweden (2000) Table 6, Statistics Sweden (1990) Tables 2-415
Table 3 Regression of net worth 1997 and 1999 on selected
                      socio-economic variables





Married/cohabiting -38442 22272 -1,73
Single woman -109700 19557 -5,61
Indicator of workhours -36678 18529 -1,98
If part-time old-age pension 55499 43703 1,27
If other pension and age < 65 -69603 19844 -3,51
If deducted payment to private pension policy 108170 12825 8,43
Immigrant from Nordic country -149791 15064 -9,94
Other immigrant -80546 15427 -5,22
Self employed 140430 43430 3,23
Farmer 1012459 94431 10,72
Unspecified education -109549 24756 -4,43
At most 9 years of schooling -98706 14922 -6,61
High school or equivalent -33431 13209 -2,53
College/university < 3 år, technical -7275 18571 -0,39
College/university >= 3 år, technical 169317 32964 5,14
College/university >= 3 år, nontechnical 180340 43460 4,15
Living in Stockholm -105834 28471 -3,72
Living in Göteborg -102740 16128 -6,37
Living in  Malmö -99379 17177 -5,79
Living in middle Sw. outside the three big cities -61453 13366 -4,60
Urban living in northern Swedeni -80805 19656 -4,11
Rural living in nothern Sweden -54529 21961 -2,48
Interaction own hourse x Stockholm 647459 93437 6,93
Interaction own house x Göteborg 344589 25933 13,29
Interaction own house x Malmö 391637 57224 6,84
Interaction own house x South Sweden. 142340 20017 7,11
Interaction own house x urban north. 164095 40476 4,05
Interaction own house x rural north 55360 27113 2,04
Interaction co-op x Stockholm 417397 65563 6,37
Interaction co-op x Göteborg 55320 18374 3,01
Interaction co-op x Malmö 35235 21890 1,61
Interaction co-op x southern Sweden. 56430 73409 0,77
Interaction co-op x urban north. 44289 42365 1,05
Interaction co-op x rural north. -67496 35081 -1,92
age 25-29 -49748 9944 -5,00
age 30-34 -77732 11991 -6,48
age 35-39 -44509 13164 -3,38
age 40-44 5501 20980 0,26
age 45-49 53320 16905 3,15
age 50-54 236107 31803 7,42
age 55-59 340954 30921 11,03
age 60-64 359995 22461 16,03
age 65-69 391351 28638 13,67
age 70-74 426649 33427 12,76
age 75-79 445588 32953 13,52
age 80-84 493207 55077 8,95
If 1997 -58369 11499 -5,08
Constant 204889 21498 9,53
Number of observations 33861
R
2 0,074
Note. Source Andersson et al (2002) Table 3.2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors estimated according to White. The indicator for work hours is the sum of the
indicators for all adult members of the household, and for each adult the indicator
can take one of fours values: 1, 0.75. 0.35 and 0, indicating the share of full time.16
Table  4    Private wealth and the capital value of public pensions and negotiated
group pensions in 1999.  (Medians in 1000SEK computed at the individual
level)













Financial assets    70   121   119    80  114
Tangible assets   293   429   439   362   34
Debts   128   167   176   140    0
Old age pension  1117  1286  1278  1087  660
“Premiepension” (funded
social security)




   Blue collar workers   204
   White collar workers ITP   245
   White collar workers ITPK   207
   Government employees STAT   232
   Government empl. STATF   129
   Local gov. empl. KOM   177
   Local gov. empl. KOMF    72
Gross wealth  1690  2522  2362  1775 1238
Net wealth  1546  2354  2199  1634 1222
Source: Andersson et al (2002) Tables 3.8 and 3.10. Computational details in Andersson et al (2002) Appendix.
Note: This table was obtained using the individual and not the household as a unit.
Table 5    Estimates of mean wealth in private pension
                 policies using alternative methods. (1997 1000SEK)
Percent with policy Over all mean Mean if holding
The HUS surveys (households)
1985          14.4        13          89
1992          32.6        33        103
1997          24.9        30        120
Flood (2003) using LINDA (individuals)
1999         30.3       31        104
2000         32.0       36        11117
Figure 1  Relative price indices for stocks and shares on the Stockholm Stock
Exchange and for the prices on one and two family houses (1980=100)
Note: Both price indices are relative to the CPI with the same base year.18
Figure 2 Age - wealth profiles for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile of the 1999 net
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Source: Andersson et.al. (2002), primary source HINK/HEK 199919
Figure 3.  Median age – net worth profiles 1983 and 1997 (1993 SEK)
Note: Source Klevmarken (2002b) Table 2. The figure shows cross-sectionally estimated piecewise linear splines. Data originate from the HUS
surveys. Net worth does not include private pension policies and annuities